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Abstract 
 
We present the first broadly representative study for any early twentieth century 
economy of the extent to which quoted company ownership was already divorced 
from managerial control. In the 337 largest, independent, UK companies in the 
Investor’s Year Book (those with £1m or more share capital in 1911) the two million 
outside shareholders were fewer than today’s shareholding population, but they held 
97.5% of the shares in the median company and their directors only 2.5%. This 
indicates a lower level of personal ownership by boards, and of director voting 
control, in the largest securities market of the early twentieth century than in any of 
the world’s major securities markets toward the end of that century. Berle, Means, 
Gordon and others later quantified the USA’s delayed (and on this dimension less 
advanced) managerial “revolution.” Their evidence has been widely misinterpreted: 
some erroneously concluded that America pioneered this aspect of “modernity” and 
that the “divorce” of ownership from control, globally, was a new and continuing 
trend. 
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              The debate on whether managerial control was divorced from share 
ownership in early twentieth century Britain exhibits an extreme lack of consensus, 
compromised as it is by inconsistent definitions and unrepresentative samples.1 Here 
we substantially resolve these issues, relying on a source, the Investor’s Year Book, 
which, after brief contemporary exposure, endured decades of oblivion.2 This 
directory itemises shareholder numbers and the amount directors held: fuller 
information than is available in the UK for the next eight decades, providing historical 
data approaching in quality and coverage that published for major markets today. The 
results are striking: the level of board ownership in British companies was lower 
before World War One than observed anywhere toward the end of the twentieth 
century. The conventional wisdom that the century experienced a revolutionary 
“divorce” of ownership from control and the rise of a new “managerial” capitalism is 
an urban myth. The evolution of managerial control in the UK was substantially 
complete before 1914. 
               This will be less of a surprise to those familiar with historical work on the 
drivers of these developments than to minds misdirected by Whiggish elaborations of 
the locus classicus, Berle and Means.3 The growth of professional managerial 
hierarchies with internal labour markets - the largest ones employing more than a 
thousand clerks in one headquarters building - is well documented for London,  the 
world’s largest “head-office city.”4 Pessimistic evalua tions of securities market 
development before 1914 have also faded: the UK, the world’s third largest economy, 
                                                 
1 At one extreme Alfred D. Chandler (Scale) famously saw Britain’s exceptionally high levels of 
personal ownership as driving poor business performance; at the other, Hannah (“Divorce”) contrasts 
low levels in the UK with high US and German personal ownership. Cheffins and Bank (“Is Berle and 
Means”) are judiciously moderate. 
2 This annual directory was edited by Herbert Bassett, of the Investment Registry’s Financial Review of 
Reviews. Early issues were published in-house and occasionally surface in antiquarian booksellers. 
From 1909, when it was published by Letts and widely noticed in periodicals, rare library copies 
survive until the 1915 issue, after which it apparently ceased publication. 
3 Modern Corporation. 
4 Heller, London Clerical Workers; Seltzer and Frank, “Promotion tournaments.” 
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had the world’s largest stock market so it requires some obtuseness to present British 
finance as uniquely constrained.5 Recent studies have clarified aspects of trust 
relationships, contractual protections, and information signalling which fostered 
widespread shareholding.6 Even sceptics have recognised that the separation of 
ownership from control was exceptionally advanced in UK banks and railways.7 In 
whichever sector, the common thread was a shift (albeit never complete) from firms 
substantially owned and managed by individuals or local syndicates to companies 
with shares freely traded on organised stock exchanges, owned by thousands of 
shareholders, in which most directors held office by virtue of their skills, knowledge 
and networks, and promotion or recruitment to the board, not because they held 
preponderant ownership stakes. The next section explains the coverage of our data 
and the expanding domain of public companies; sections 2 and 3 consider the 
numbers of shareholders and the extent of board shareholdings and voting power; 
section 4 calibrates comparisons across time and space; section 5 sketches some 
implications. 
 
                                                                      I 
 
                         The Investor’s Year Book was compiled by the Investment Registry, 
founded in 1880 by a group of wealthy London investors. Their securities guide - sold 
at a shilling initially and four shillings from 1912 - was likely a loss- leader 
inducement to investor clients: market professionals used directories like the London 
                                                 
5 Hannah, “J P Morgan” and “London;” Michie, “Finance.” 
6 Franks et al., “Ownership;” Campbell and Turner, “Substitutes;” Hannah, “Pioneering Corporate 
Governance;” Musacchio, “Laws.” 
7 Cheffins, Corporate Governance, pp.230-8. 
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Stock Exchange’s (LSE’s) Official Intelligence.8 Its content was abbreviated but also 
qualitatively different, including (from the 1910 edition) shareholder numbers and 
(from 1911) the amount held by directors. This required their staff to make labour-
intensive searches of full lists of shareholdings, which registered companies had to 
make available to any enquirer and update annually at Somerset House in London (or 
at two smaller provincial registries).9 One clue to the ir motivation for collating and 
publishing this esoteric information is a staff member’s suggestion that “If it is found 
that the Directors are but small shareholders, there is the risk that the management 
may not display active intelligence. If there are large blocks of shares held in a few 
hands, then the price of shares is uncertain, as an avalanche of stock may descend on 
the market at any time. In an ideal list of shareholders the Directors should have large 
personal stakes of old standing and the rest of the shares should be distributed in the 
smallest possible lots among bona-fide Investors who have no City address.”10  
                    The Appendix lists the largest, independent, British-owned companies in 
the directory with shares quoted on a UK stock exchange: those having at least £1m 
nominal value of issued share capital. Thousands of merely medium-sized companies 
were also then traded on London and more than twenty UK provincial exchanges, but 
we chose this cut-off to confine our study to the larger size range of firms listed on the 
pre-1914 NYSE (where initial public offerings (IPOs) of less than $5m - about £1m - 
were rare) or on today’s LSE (£1m is equivalent to £76m today, adjusted by the 
                                                 
8 The 1912 Yearbook  cost £0.20, the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence £2.50 and Skinner’s Stock 
Exchange Year Book  £1.40 (Pitman, Where , p. xvii), with, respectively, 532, 1,742, and 2,098 pages. 
9 Apart from this window of published data for 1911-1915, levels of UK board ownership cannot be 
measured as fully and representatively for the nineteenth century, nor most of the twentieth, except for 
returns made to Edinburgh. Dublin returns were apparently victims of the troubles of 1916-22 and for 
the overwhelming majority choosing London registry only the returns of the minority of continuing 
companies are retained by Companies House (now in Cardiff); the rest have been extensively and non-
randomly weeded by the National Archives, or (for most chartered and statutory companies) were 
never filed. 
10 Lowenfeld, All about Investment, p. 183.  
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RPI).11 Most data are drawn from the 1912 edition, generally reflecting the late 1911 
position, and appear to be broadly reliable on board shares12 and a little out-of-date on 
shareholder numbers and capital.13  
                      The LSE before 1914 was the global stock market: it traded a third of 
the world’s securities and 71 of the world’s hundred largest quoted corporations had 
at least one of their securities listed there.14 Including all 43 of them headquartered 
overseas would frustrate our objective of covering business enterprises principally 
owned and controlled in the UK. Companies operating overseas were included if they 
met the following criteria, also applied to domestic firms: 
- the businesses were registered as UK companies, 
- with sterling share capital, 
-  largely British-owned, 
-  and wholly or partly British-managed. 
Also in our population are a small number of companies registered overseas in which 
British shareholdings were probably dominant and there was a large minority or a 
majority of British directors. Foreign and colonial companies listed on London, but 
with negligible British management, and companies, wherever registered, in which 
UK holders constituted a minority or mainly held bonds have generally been 
excluded.15 Finally, even where companies maintained a separate British corporate 
                                                 
11 In 2010, firms valued at £100m or below accounted for less than 1% of the LSE’s Main Market 
capitalisation (www. londonstockexchange.com/statistics). Today the external financing of medium-
sized firms is the preserve of venture capitalists, banks, private equity, business angels and markets like 
AIM, not of major stock exchanges. 
12 The directory reports high board ownership figures in cases where the literature or surviving 
Companies Registry returns signal this and low figures where we know that to be appropriate. 
13 The Railway Year Book 1912  and the Banker’s Almanac 1912 also report shareholder numbers, 
generally giving higher figures.  
14 Authors’ calculation from a list of the largest global companies by market capitalisation in 1912 
(Wardley, “Top 100”). 
15 The Suez Canal and Hongkong & Shanghai Bank were included, Borax Consolidated and Royal 
Dutch Shell excluded; but we may have misclassified these and other companies with large British 
shareholdings because of deficient information on fluctuating ownership of constantly traded shares in 
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identity, stock exchange listing and/or board, we excluded them if they were 
subsidiaries of other companies, since their ultimate control may be presumed to lie 
with the parent.16 
                    The coverage of the Investor’s Year Book appears to be comprehensive, 
comparing favourably with lists of large firms compiled for dates between 1904 and 
1919 in fourteen, very diversely-focused, research studies.17 Most of the firms in their 
lists (and some they omit) are included, if they were in 1911 quoted, British-owned, 
independent and had £1m+ nominal share capital. The only major gap is non-ferrous, 
non-coal, mining enterprises operating abroad. There were around 60 such £1m+ 
companies not appearing in the Investor’s Year Book : all traded in London (and many 
also in Paris) and owned by British, American or continental investors (in uncertain 
proportions). Some (like Consolidated Goldfields) were possibly widely held, while in 
others (like Burmah Oil) board members were large shareholders. This variability 
means that any guess at the level at which these companies could be incorporated into 
our analysis would be arbitrary.18 Otherwise, we have been able to identify from the 
available lists of large companies only two British-registered, listed companies 
operating overseas and meeting the admission criteria that were excluded (both Asian 
                                                                                                                                            
this globalised pre-1914 world. We are not suppressing much information by omitting overseas-
registered corporations, since shareholder registers were less easily accessible in other jurisdictions. 
16 Among the subsidiaries thus excluded, some (e.g. Pacific Steam Navigation) were controlled by 
British companies in our population; others (e.g. British Westinghouse), though the subsidiaries may 
have been majority-British-owned, had voting structures that left control with overseas entities. 
17 Boughey, “Brit ish overseas railways,” p. 489, Boyce, “64thers,” pp. 184, 195; Chandler, Scale, 
pp.666-72 ; Church, History, p. 400; Gourvish and Wilson, British Brewing, p. 380; Hannah, Rise, pp. 
187-90; Hausman et al., Global Electrification, pp. 106-7; Jeremy, Capitalists, pp. 420-25; Jones, 
British Multinational Banking, pp. 396-7 ; Marchildon, Promotion, pp. 253-4; Payne, “Emergence” pp. 
539-40; Schmitz, Growth, pp. 23-5; Scott and Hughes, Anatomy , pp. 56-65; Shaw, “Large 
Manufacturing Employers,” pp. 52-3; Wardley, “Top 100.” We also checked all firms in the LSE’s  
Daily Official List for 2 January 1912. 
18 This sector was omitted from the Investors’ Year Book  from 1909 onwards, for reasons not stated, 
and accounted for 4.5% of the profits of all British firms assessed for income tax (Worswick and 
Tipping, Profits, pp. 87, 89). 
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plantation companies, with recent IPOs on the LSE),19 and only three similar domestic 
companies (only thinly traded on northern exchanges).20 So, with a total of £1,926m 
share capital in 337 £1m+ companies, the directory appears to cover around 98% of 
targeted firms. 
               In the majority of cases, the Investor’s Year Book provided data on 
shareholdings, but for nearly a third of large companies omitted data on board 
holdings and/or shareholder numbers (while including both for almost all smaller 
companies). No reason is given, but many railways were so big and their 
shareholdings so obviously widely dispersed that publishing precise information was 
probably considered superfluous.21 An overseas, parliamentary or royal charter 
(common among large companies but often allowing access only to shareholder 
names and addresses - not holdings - and at company headquarters not Somerset 
House) appears to have inhibited reporting, as did occasional bearer shares. For more 
than a tenth of the companies, we have used company histories, known voting caps, 
archives and other sources, opting for the highest level in the event of conflicting 
estimates, to bias the results against our conclusion.22 As a last resort, for around one-
fifth of the companies (mainly railways), we have estimated board shareholdings 
econometrically from their known correlates (company size, sector, corporate age,  
numbers of directors and of shareholders and main places of listing and of 
 
 
                                                 
19 Grand Central (Ceylon) Rubber Estates and Anglo-Dutch Plantations of Java. There were doubtless 
other unlisted (but LSE-traded) companies omitted. 
20 Reckitt & Son was listed on the Leeds exchange, many of its non-family shares being owned by trade 
customers and employees (Reckitt, History, pp. 47, 91). Boots and Tootal Broadhurst Lee were quoted 
on the Sheffield and Manchester exchanges, respectively, but only a portion of their share capital was 
actually listed. 
21 The LNWR was exceptionally transparent, disclosing directors’ stock-holdings in its annual reports, 
yet the Investor’s Year Book  does not report this. 
22 A search for missing data was made in Hannah (“Divorce”), Cheffins (Corporate Ownership), the 
Railway Year Book 1912, Banker’s Almanac 1912, company histories, Google Books, Guildhall 
Library listing files (MS18000) and company archives. 
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Table 1. Inauguration Dates of UK Companies in our Population (col. 1) and 
more generally (cols 2-6). 
 
Date              1911 £1m+    All Life Insurance    All 1911 UK              All Companies 
                       Companies     Companies     Railways   Banks          Acts Registrations  
                        (numbers)       (numbers)    (numbers) (numbers)    (numbers)  (Paid-up                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                            Cap £m) 
Pre-1800               10                   48               na               7                na                  na              
1800-29         15                   68                5                7                na                  na 
1830-39         31                   57               14             29                na                  na 
1840-49                20                 119               24               2                     500†         na  
1850-59                18                 129               22               4                  1,316           na  
1860-69                42                 108               34             14                  6,362         926* 
1870-79                27                   19               15             10                10,155         844 
1880-89                61                     9               30               8                18,583      1,971 
1890-99                80                   11               22             15                37,682      2,042 
1900-11                28                   16               13              9                 59,719      1,753 
* no values available for 1860-61. 
† The 1844 Companies Act took effect on 1 November. In September 1844, 947 English and 47 Irish 
companies were already known, under various dispensations such as common law deeds-of-settlement, 
the 1821-26 Banking Acts or the 1837 Trading Companies Act (but excluding many companies with 
royal charters or private acts of parliament); their earlier inauguration dates are not recorded. The 1844-
56 figures in this column also exclude Scottish companies, and are arbitrarily allocated between the 
1840s (500) and 1850s (456). 
 
Source: col. 1: authors’ calculations; col. 2: Andras, Historical Review, pp. 101-18 (this encompasses 
an eclectic range of chartered, statutory, mutual and deed-of- settlement insurers and Companies Act 
registrations and many which were defunct or no longer independent by 1911); col. 3: authors’ 
calculations based on all 179 extant domestic railways in the Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1912 
(excluding tramways, light railways and joint committees; note also that most post-1870 new UK 
statutory rail companies were modest branch lines and urban undergrounds); col. 4: authors’ 
calculations based on all 105 extant UK-headquartered  banks and discount companies in the SEOI 
1912 (excluding private banks; note that most post-1870 new UK bank incorporations operated 
primarily overseas); cols. 5 and 6: Shannon, “First Five Thousand,” pp. 420-24; SEOI 1912, p.1626 
(note that these columns exclude many large companies such as domestic railways and other statutory 
and chartered corporations and that most of those included did not survive to 1911). 
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operation).23 
                   Table 1 charts the timing of the processes generating this upper tail of the 
UK company size distribution, showing in column 1 the inauguration dates - when 
they were established in their modern form - for all 337 companies. This is not  
always the date of foundation, for some of these companies had earlier origins as sole 
proprietorships, partnerships or deed-of-settlement companies. Even if it was a second 
incorporation, the inauguration date highlighted in directories often marked a strategic 
decision to operate on a larger scale (merger or a major new capital-raising) or 
slightly pre-dated the IPO of the shares of one-time family-owned firms or of new 
concessions established by venture capitalists. 
                  Half had been established in their modern corporate form in the last four 
decades, but several were pre- industrial: the oldest was Hudson’s Bay, originally 
chartered in London in 1670 (though reconstructed in1863). Many statutory, chartered 
and deed-of-settlement companies had begun to separate ownership from control well 
before general joint-stock registration in 1844 and general limited liability in 1855, as 
columns 1-4 collectively suggest.24 Columns 5 and 6 show the rise of the simplified 
new incorporations under the 1844 and subsequent Companies Acts: mostly smaller 
and including increasing numbers of private, unquoted companies. Columns 1 and 6 
together suggest that incorporations trended upwards in the long nineteenth century, 
                                                 
23 Board ownership data was published for all brewery companies (generally recognised as having 
persistent family ownership), but was available for only a minority of railways (a sector generally 
accepted as managerially -controlled). Estimation of missing data was therefore critical to avoiding 
selection bias.  
24 Cols 1 and 3-4 understate this because they sometimes register a secondary re-incorporation. The 
suggestion that the USA (liberated after 1783 from the thrall of Britain’s “Bubble Act”) was faster off 
the mark in chartering corporations is occasionally encountered, and that is true in terms of numbers of 
early nineteenth century corporate charters (if we assiduously count the numerous small, private, 
unquoted and defunct American corporations), but extant, quoted companies constitute a quite different 
story. It took the NYSE eight decades following its local “early” 1811 incorporation law to attain the 
same corporate capitalisation/national income ratio (around 50%)  achieved by the LSE before 
Britain’s “late” 1855 limited liability law. General incorporation laws have been overemphasised in the 
literature: initially, specific charters granted by legislatures exceeded those under liberalised general 
provisions (in both jurisdictions) and a higher proportion of early UK companies were large and 
publicly traded. 
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with a notable surge in larger formations in the 1880s and 1890s, and a lull after 
1900.25 The UK managerial “revolution” is thus most plausibly located in the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century, when most large manufacturing and distribution 
firms and many new utilities and British ventures overseas went public. But 
“evolution” is perhaps the more appropriate term: for example, the change was 
already well-advanced for many railways, other utilities and financial companies by 
the mid-Victorian period. Moreover, in the decades after their IPO, insiders typically 
released more shares to the general public, as they gradually diversified their own 
wealth portfolios, while expanding their firms. 
                 Accompanying this evolutionary separation of ownership from control 
were changes in top managerial personnel, in their selection and training, and in their 
functions. Company secretaries were a classic profession, with examined 
qualifications in corporate law, investor relations and boardroom procedure.26 By 
contrast, directors (like managers in general) - with the exception of some formally-
qualified actuaries, bankers, chemists, doctors, engineers and lawyers - were largely 
qualified by practical experience or reputation, so were as ambiguously and diversely 
professional as they remain today. Some, like Henry Overton Wills, were large 
owners who had long retired from the family business and delegated management to 
others. He was the largest (13%) holder of Imperial Tobacco shares, with nearly £2m, 
perhaps half his fortune, invested, but, when he died in 1911, the family patriarch’s 
attendance at board meetings had long been delinquent.27  
                                                 
25 On the other hand, Essex-Crosby’s (“Joint Stock Companies”) analysis of 5,337 quoted companies 
registered under the British Companies Acts (most with below £1m capital) shows continually rising 
decadal rates of foundation up to 1914. 
26 By 1911 the Institute of Secretaries had 3,544 members and there was a similar Secretaries’ 
Association offering professional examinations; the two merged in 1937 (Anon, Chartered Institute, 
pp.1-47, 145, 187-92). On the other hand, members qualified for the Institute of Directors (founded in 
1903) by holding the office, not by examination. 
27 Alford, Wills, pp. 242, 263, 282, 328.    
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                 In railways, and many banks and insurance companies, millionaire owners 
were rarer and the majority of the board were typically outside (non-executive)28 
directors (akin to a German Aufsichtsrat, or supervisory board), including 
businessmen from other sectors, financiers and national or local worthies (peers, MPs, 
JPs). Professional railwaymen, bankers or actuaries promoted to directorships from 
within these companies’ own management hierarchies (inside directors) were usually 
a minority. On the other hand, some owner-entrepreneurs used directorships to reward 
their senior managers and/or prepare them for succession and had no non-executives 
on their boards: they resembled a German Vorstand (management board) more than 
an Aufsichtsrat. Many other UK boards were also working committees of senior 
managers, though it was common to appoint one or more non-executives, who could 
be helpful to the business or re-assure outside shareholders: they included major 
shareholders, financiers, lawyers, engineers, consultants, non-competing businessmen, 
politicians and non-practising accountants (many accountants in private practice were 
reluctant to become directors, since, from 1900, this barred them from auditing the 
company). Some company chairmen (especially those combining the post with that of 
managing director) were dictators (albeit elected), like some US CEOs;29 but on other 
boards there was more of a balance of power, chairmen being chosen by their 
colleagues as primi inter pares.30 
 
                                                                        II 
                                                 
28 As with non-executives today, some devoted multiple days each month to the job, while others did 
little more than attend meetings. 
29 These included both dominant founding entrepreneurs (Lord Leverhulme in Lever Brothers) and 
professional managers with negligible shareholdings (Sir Edwin Holden in London City & Midland 
Bank). 
30 Balance could be dysfunctional, as in multi-firm mergers whose constituents used board membership 
to block post-merger rationalization, but, as the case of CPA showed, such errors in governance could 
quickly be rectified by a shareholders’ investigation committee (Pitt, “Strategic and Structural 
Change”). 
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                         The numbers of shareholders in these companies ranged widely, from 
a low of only 170 (in Martin’s Bank, one of the last of the family-owned clearers to 
go public31) up to 79,400 (in the Midland Railway, a reliably dividend-paying 
mainstay of the proverbial widows and orphans). The mean was 6,177 shareholders 
and the median 3,000: levels which made it difficult, but - unlike today - still possible, 
for non-negligible proportions of them to participate in AGMs at venues such as 
London’s Cannon Street Hotel, which could accommodate up to 2,000. The US 
experience of large companies reporting zero AGM attendances was unknown in a 
compact, urbanized nation, with fast trains, a tradition of shareholder activism and 
extensive national reporting of their proceedings.32 Most holders were passive but 
others still felt a financial compulsion to attend : the mean shareholding was as much 
as £925 (equivalent to about £70,000 today). The range around this average was wide, 
with small shareholders especially attracted by well-known brands like Lipton (the 
chain grocer famed for its teas): its mean shareholding - only £68 - was less than the 
£100 block that London stockbrokers normally traded.33 The highest mean 
shareholding was 184 times that, in Underground Electric Railway, whose chairman, 
the banker Sir Edgar Speyer, had coordinated this pyramided merger of London tubes 
and tramways, acting for a group of wealthy American investors.34  
                                                 
31 Chandler, Four Centuries, pp. 336-7, 411-4.  
32 Rutterford, “The Shareholder Voice.”  
33 Lipton was one of the rare companies to show a marked decline in shareholder numbers: from 74,000 
at its 1898 IPO (Green et al, Men, p. 196) to 33,000 by 1911.  
34 The Underground’s shareholder numbers (400) are misleadingly low, since there remained thousands 
more shareholders in pyramided group subsidiaries, unrecorded in this parent-only figure. We have left 
this company (and the probably Belgian-controlled Anglo-Argentine Tramways) in a population 
confined to British-owned companies, because of their large subsidiary shareholdings and uncertainty 
on the nationality of the majority. 
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               All these figures relate to the nominal (par) value of issued (not merely 
authorised) and subscribed (not necessarily paid-up) share capital. 35 Of course, the ir 
market prices sometimes varied markedly from par. The Bankers’ Magazine index 
indicates that the market for similar securities was about 34% above par at this time, 
so the average shareholding was probably worth about £1,240.36 That was many times 
a manual worker’s annual wage (£50), the annual income threshold at which British 
income tax became payable (£160), or the maximum deposit permitted in the 
(government-subsidised) Post Office Savings Bank (£200). But, in a skewed 
distribution, many small shareholders had modest holdings at similar levels. 
             The numbers of shareholders had escalated rapidly, economy-wide. In 1849 
there were only 36,271 shareholdings in quoted domestic banks, in 1875 81,577, 
while by 1911 there were in excess of a quarter of a million.37 Shareholder numbers 
grew a little more slowly in railways (from around 170,000 in 1855 to 620,000 in 
1902), but probably grew faster in other sectors. This diffusion process continued over 
the next century. Lloyd’s, the largest bank of 1911, then had 22,500 shareholders, 
while today (when it is again the leading domestic retail bank after acquiring many 
competitors) it has 2.8 million.38 Remarkably, the total number of shareholdings in all 
our 337 large companies (2,081,790) was less than in this one bank today, though 
                                                 
35 Issued, subscribed and paid-up capital were by 1911 normally identical, but in a large number of 
banks and insurance companies, and a few other companies, there remained some uncalled liabilities 
(shares subscribed but not paid-up). 
36Estimated from the appropriate sub-indexes for 19 December 1911 (Banker’s Magazine, January 
1912).  
37 Acheson et al, “Does limited liability matter?” p. 260. In 1911, there were 251,649 shareholdings in 
our 39 £1m+ domestic banks alone, and additionally there were around two dozen smaller retail 
banking companies plus several dozen banks mainly operating overseas. 
38 Ibid., p.270. The expanding UK shareholding population was dramatically reduced by 
nationalisation, then increased by privatisation and demutualisation. Lloyd’s large modern shareholder 
base derives partly from its acquisitions of demutualised building societies, insurance companies and 
savings banks, whose quasi-owners were excluded from earlier shareholder data.  
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there were also approaching three million shareholdings in other UK public 
companies in 1911.39  
                 Sixteen of the 337 companies were investment trusts, twenty-two insurance 
companies and more than a hundred were already offering their employees funded 
pensions, all three of these institutional investment vehicles spreading beneficial 
interests in securities more widely; and a few (notably gas companies) encouraged 
employee shareholding. Yet small samples of shareholder registers in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century suggest that no more than 5-7% of shareholders with 
identifiable occupations were working class, so this is not the “democratic” capital 
market over-enthusiastically claimed by contemporary boosters of capitalism.40 Our 
figures simply confirm that direct share ownership was widely disseminated among 
the comfortably-off bourgeoisie.  
                                                        
                                                                      III 
 
                 The Investor’s Year Book data on board shareholdings enable us to 
calibrate control more precisely. 101 sterling millionaires were recorded as dying in 
1900-19 and, if this generation of plutocrats (or their heirs) had each fully funded one 
of our smaller companies, most of them would have substantially exhausted their 
resources.41 Plutocratic undiversified investment in the formal capital markets simply 
did not happen on this scale : in fact, in only nine of our companies did the whole 
board collectively hold shares with a nominal value of £1m+. By that yardstick, only 
six branded goods manufacturers, two banks and one railway were personally owned 
                                                 
39 Green at al., Men, pp. 163-4, with an allowance for the 1901-11 increase and a further 1m 
shareholders in the British-owned (statutory and chartered) companies not registered under the 
Companies Acts. 
40 Green et al., Men, p. 203. Compare Quail, “Investment.”  
41 Rubinstein, Men, p. 63.  
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by the super-rich.42 Many giant firms of 1911 simply could not have existed in the 
society of personal capitalism that had been the norm a century earlier. If, as the 
literature suggests, economies of scale and scope, widening markets, managerial and 
technological innovations and network effects had driven firm growth, that had 
clearly in part been facilitated by the aggregation through stock exchanges of the 
wealth of hundreds of thousands of more modest capitalists, delegating management 
to thousands of entrepreneurs and professional administrators. 
                   Nonetheless, directors had more wealth committed to their firms than the 
average shareholder. The LSE’s listing rules required that directors be shareholders, 
so the US phenomenon of professional directors holding no corporate stock was rare 
in Britain.43 The mean requirement was £2,113 nominal, but the amount varied from 
£1 (in Rhodesia Railways) up to £20,000 (in Ellerman Lines). The lower requirements 
were well within reach of the average shareholder in these companies (who held 
£925), but the higher ones were not trivial, when even a well-paid clerk might earn 
only £200 pa. Nonetheless they were a feasibly negotiable hurdle for most successful 
career managers earning £1,000+ annual salaries in their forties: the professionals 
who could most realistically aspire to directorships in large public companies.44 For 
smaller companies an above-average requirement could mean the board collectively 
                                                 
42 The holdings of 136 directors (mainly members of the founding families) in Guinness, Peter Walker, 
Whitbread, Coats, Imperial Tobacco, Lever Brothers, Barclays and the Union of London & Smith’s 
Bank averaged £144,118 per director. The Cardiff Railway board’s holdings are not reported, but the 
Marquis of Bute personally developed this railway (linking his coal mines and port); we have estimated 
board holdings at £2.2m.  
43 500 of the 3,000 directors of the USA’s 200 largest corporations had no stockholdings in 1939 
(TNEC, Distribution, p. 59). The much rarer cases of this in Britain were in unlisted companies or 
unquoted subsidiaries. The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence reports each company’s director 
shareholding requirement. 
44 A good house on Wimbledon Common, which such directors might have bought (and could, if 
necessary, mortgage), then cost £1,000; its Kensington equivalent perhaps three times that. Generous 
directors’ fees helped ease the pain for new appointees and some companies allowed an interval after 
appointment for purchase, issued directors’ shares at par rather than market, or were suspected of 
tolerating non-compliance. 
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needed to own a significant tranche of their capital, but in one large railway requiring 
only £100 the effective floor on board shareholding was well under 0.01%.  
                    The mean director’s personal stake - at £19,986 - was well above the 
modal requirement and more than 21 times that of the average shareholder, though, 
unsurprisingly, many directors held only the minimum and others an order of 
magnitude more.45 With an average of 9.6 directors, these British boards were 
generally smaller than their German and American counterparts.46 Fewer than three 
thousand 47 men thus controlled these commanding heights of the British corporate 
economy, but they collectively owned only 3.4% (£65m) of the total share capital 
(£1,926m). This is a very low figure for a rich rentier society with massive inherited 
wealth, increasingly tinged, it is true, with meritocracy, but one whose novelists 
understood that choosing one’s right father and wife secured worldly wealth more 
effectively than choosing one’s right education and job.48 Moreover, these directors’ 
share in the ownership of all these companies’ securities was even smaller since 
debentures (of which the general public probably held an even higher portion) are not 
included in these figures.49 On the other hand, board ownership of the equity capital 
itself (as is common in such studies before the more rigorous disclosure laws of recent 
years) will be understated, if nominee accounts, holdings of close family members 
                                                 
45 Forty years’ later (when we have fuller data on individual directors) two members of the average 
board of large companies owned the minimum (usually less than the mean shareholding), while a 
wealthier group had massive personal stakes (Florence, Ownership, pp. 99, 223-65). 
46 German boards averaged 12.7 directors and US ones 14.4 in 1914 (Fear and Kobrak, “Banks on 
Board,” p. 713). 
47 The appendix shows 3,252 directorships, but, allowing for those serving on two or more boards, 
there were perhaps 2,761 directors (applying the 1904 ratio in Scott and Griff, Directors, p.42) 
48 Novelists like Galsworthy were right if the UK resembled France, for which we have more reliable 
data on such matters (Piketty, “Long-run Evolution,” p. 71). Three decades later a society 
conventionally considered more meritocratic felt able to congratulate itself that the officers and 
directors of the 200 largest US non-financial corporations owned a mere 5.5% (Scoville and Sargent, 
Facts, pp. 473-83). 
49 Most of these companies’ capital was in shares (£1,250m ordinaries, £676m preferences and similar, 
quasi-fixed-interest, shares) with an additional £723m in (fixed-interest) debentures. 
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and of directors acting as trustees or as representatives of large block-holders who 
were not themselves directors were not included.50 
                 It is difficult to gauge the extent of this issue in 1911, but there were 
certainly some non-director block-holders and some of the modest measured level of 
directorial wealth may reflect the diversion of Britain’s leisured business elite to 
cultural, charitable, political, sporting or social pursuits, while delegating the direction 
of their firms to loyal minions. Some did give up the reins of power in pursuit of 
pleasure, but many more seem to have led multi-dimensional lives: it was not difficult 
(given a capacious and venturesome mind, wifely support, a dozen domestic servants 
and a competent amanuensis) for an Edwardian plutocrat to chair his own business, sit 
in the House of Lords or Commons, endow a hospital or university and acquire a 
private art collection; indeed in some circles it was rather expected. Women’s options 
were more constrained: they accounted for a third of shareholders, but almost never 
served as directors of public companies.51 The widow and daughters of Sir Donald 
Currie had inherited his 32% shareholding in Union Castle Mail Steamship when he 
died in 1909, and essentially called the shots, but their all-male board of 1911 
registered only 2.5% ownership in our data.52 Charities, foreigners, or the self-
indulgent wealthy and retired not wishing to serve as directors might also have had 
substantial, unreported block-holdings. For example, George Herring, a successful 
professional gambler who had invested his winnings in electrical enterprises, had been 
chairman of one of our companies (City of London Electric) and a major investor in 
                                                 
50 Family members with the same name and directors acting as trustees - if they were the first named 
trustee - would be readily identifiable from the registers and shares held in trust normally counted as 
directors’ qualifying shares (Palmer, Company Law, p.184), though it would not be so readily apparent 
if directors used nominee accounts or represented block-holders. The directory is silent on how it 
treated any of these cases. 
51 Rutterford et al., “Who comprised,” p. 169.  
52 Porter, Victorian Shipping, pp. 260, 290. Their control was short-lived: in April 1912 they agreed a 
sale to Royal Mail. Meux’s Brewery was another case of female ownership with control delegated to 
minions. 
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another (British Electric Traction). When he died in 1906 he left £750,000 of his 
£1,371,000 fortune to a hospital charity which possibly retained extensive holdings in 
these companies in 1911.53 As far as shareholdings registered by nominees are 
concerned, this likely resulted in some director shareholdings being missed in 1911 
and even more in later years.54 The tell-tale sign of undisclosed block-holders is the 
combination of suspiciously low numbers of shareholders with low director voting 
powers, a test implying there were relatively few cases.55  
                The separation of securities ownership from managerial control involves 
further ambiguities. In all periods fixed-interest bondholders are not owners, but 
technically, like bankers, merely lenders (with privileged recourse in the event of non-
payment of interest, which may unhappily convert them into owners). Such 
conditional ownership of capital does not equate to control in normal times: 
debentures and bonds only rarely conferred voting rights, unless the company 
defaulted on interest payments. About a third of the capital of our 337 companies was 
in the form of debentures and preference shares which carried no, or very limited, 
voting rights. Also, many quasi-public undertakings - like water boards and (colonial) 
state-guaranteed railways (none of which are included here) - issued only bonds and 
loans: there was no equity.56 In such organisations, the directors routinely had control 
                                                 
53 Fulford, Five Decades, p. 20. However charities (or other trustees) lacking broader investment 
powers than laid down in the Trustee Investments Acts were still legally barred from holding almost all 
ordinary and most voting preference shares considered here. Another later source of high block-holding 
(by parent companies) co-existing with low board holdings (of their appointed directors) is also absent 
from our population, since we exclude such subsidiaries. 
54For the low initial use of nominee accounts and their later rise see Church (History, p. 434); Franks et 
al (“Ownership,” p. 4030, n.14); and Florence (Ownership). 
55 However, it is not fool-proof: it fails to detect the British government’s 44% shareholding in the Suez 
Canal (represented by 3 of 32 directors). The significance of block-holding depends not only on its 
incidence, but on its (also unclear) role. Chandler (Scale, pp. 248-9) believed that block-holders who 
were not directors did not compromise management professionalism: the owner-directors measured 
here were, for him, the fundamental British problem.  
56 We excluded many such widely-held entities: public boards (e.g. the Port of London), entirely state-
guaranteed entities (e.g. many Indian railways), as well as de facto colonial governments (e.g. the 
British South Africa Company). We found one company, Lima Light Power & Tramways, with share 
capital of £1.35m, whose 1910 Peruvian charter gave its (British) £1.2m debenture holders majority 
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without ownership: management was even more independent of security owners than 
in the more conventional capitalist enterprises on which the present study is focused. 
UK investors also had large overseas portfolio investments, amounting to £1.8 billion 
by 1911,57 in which control lay in hands remote from their owners, and many British 
holders did not exercise votes. Together such factors meant that the majority of the 
corporate securities owned by UK investors were substantially divorced from 
managerial control.  
                          However, modern studies of separated ownership typically focus on 
the narrower class of controlling securities. From this mainstream viewpoint, control-
light funding from bondholders or vote- less preference holders simply strengthens 
whatever controlling hand dominant capitalist interests wield. In this perspective, it is 
essential to take account of differential voting rights. Equal voting rights for all shares 
- the modern corporate norm in some countries, including the UK and USA - were 
then the exception rather than the rule: 58% of our 337 companies restricted some 
shareholders’ votes.  Sometimes large holders’ voting powers were limited (a practice 
earlier believed to protect small shareholders58), while a minority of preference and 
similar shares conferred no voting rights, or only fractional votes (a newer 
development which enabled insiders to cede cash-flow rights while retaining more 
control). One extreme case, Maple & Co, issued not only vote- less preferences but 
also special management shares, each with 500 times the votes of an ordinary share, 
so directors of this furniture company could exercise 40% of the votes while owning 
only 3% of the capital. The Stock Exchange Official Intelligence itemises these 
                                                                                                                                            
board control. We excluded this anomaly, but included the few companies in which debenture holders 
had some votes or in which a receiver had taken control on behalf of the trustees for the debenture 
holders. 
57 Corley, “Britain’s Overseas Investments,” p. 80. 
58 Hilt (“When did ownership separate”) finds such mechanisms effective in 1820s New York; 
Campbell and Turner (“Substitutes,” pp. 589-92) are sceptical for 1880s Britain. 
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diverse voting rights, so, if we assume that boards deployed their holdings to 
maximise their votes, we can calculate the board’s share of the total votes. It is this 
figure - measuring, for most firms, the maximum possible degree of board voting 
control - which forms the basis of the following analysis. It is quite clear that many 
directors wanted to reduce their financial risks and stabilise their cash flows by also 
holding some fixed-interest, non-voting shares, so this will overestimate their degree 
of voting control, but it has the merit of establishing an upper bound.59 This 
percentage is often higher than the board’s portion of the share capital (for the mean 
company about half as high again 60), but, where the voting rights of large 
shareholders were capped (as in many banks), the directors’ voting power could be 
less than their ownership of capital.  
                  Only sixteen (5%) of the 337 large British quoted companies were 
indisputably personally-controlled in the sense that the directors had more than 50% 
of the votes (and in five of these their share was 100%: no outsider had voting rights). 
Apart from six breweries61 (a sector universally acknowledged as personally-owned), 
these companies were very diverse: Imperial Tobacco, Ellerman Lines  
 (shipping), the Harmsworth newspaper empire, the Cardiff Railway, Linen Thread, 
Lister (silk), Edward Lloyd (paper/pulp), Debenhams (department stores), Steel 
Brothers (India merchants) and Alliance Assurance.62 Of course, in practice not all 
                                                 
59 Macrosty, Trust Movement, pp. 110, 130, 137, 309 for indications this may be a particular problem in 
manufacturing. A French investment analyst visiting Swan Hunter in 1905 was informed that 41% of 
directors’ holdings were in preferences, which carried only half the votes we allocated to them (Crédit 
Agricole archives, Paris, file DEEF13596/2). Similar considerations probably account for our board 
share for GKN being higher than that calculated by Franks et al (“Spending less time with the family,” 
p.  598). 
60 This suggests a stronger tendency to retain control using differential voting shares than in the UK 
today, when differential voting rights are discouraged by the stock exchange. Faccio and Lang 
(“Ultimate Ownership,” p. 392) report control rights averaging 89% of cash flow rights in the 1990s. 
Compare also the last two columns of Table 2 below. 
61 Watney, Whitbread, Worthington, Cannon, Walker and Mann. 
62 This raises the question of how they evaded London’s “two-thirds” listing rule, which required 
vendors to sell a higher portion of shares to the public. Inspection of their LSE listing files in Guildhall 
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insiders were as assiduous in retaining an absolute majority of votes: de facto one can 
retain control of a company with considerably less. On Alfred Marshall’s view that 
33% were sufficient to confer control, the proportion of owner-controlled companies 
was 11%63  and with a 20% hurdle (adopted by many later researchers) 16%. Even 
with a 5% hurdle (favoured by those desperate to diagnose continuing owner control), 
it was still only a minority (36%) of these large quoted firms of 1911 that were owner-
controlled. At the other extreme, many UK boards had negligible voting power: in 
28% of them the directors had 1% or less of the votes. The mean level of board voting 
control was 10.1%, the company-size-weighted mean 5.5% (giant firms naturally  
being less owner-controlled than merely large ones) and the median (a better measure 
of central tendency for this skewed distribution) only 2.8%.64 Table 2 confirms that it 
was quite normal for £1m+ companies to have thousands of shareholders, holdings in 
railways and manufacturers being the most widely spread (column 3). Voting control 
by directors (column 5) shows greater variance: railways (the largest contemporary 
companies) having the least (a median of 0.9%) and breweries the most (44.1%). The 
extraordinarily strong board control of Britain’s “beerocracy” was contrived by 
quoted brewers’ exceptionally high retained personal ownership stakes, magnified by 
their unmatched enthusiasm for issuing non-voting shares (compare columns 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Library MS 18000 suggests by listing before the (1850s) rule, listing on a less fussy provincial 
exchange, post-issue buyback, post-IPO acquisition bringing more owners onto an expanded board, but 
mainly by issuing non-voting shares. 
63 Marshall, Industry and Trade, p. 317.  
64 Size -weighting measures the portion of business resources controlled; the median better indicates the 
representative type of business control. 
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Table 2. The Sectoral Distribution of Shareholdings and Board Votes 1911. 
 
    Sector                                  Companies                 Median Number         Median Board Share of  
                                            (number)  (mean share   of Shareholders  Ownership (%)     Votes (%) 
                                                            Capital £m)  
       
Railways                                     
Other Utilities  
Banks 
Insurance                                                         
Other Finance  
Distribution*                           
Primary † 
Breweries‡                                          
Manufacturing                                                  
 
Totals                                 
 78              14.8                                   
  44                 3.0 
  55                 5.1 
  22            2.3 
  23                 1.8 
24                 1.7 
  15                 2.4 
18           2.3 
58 2.5 
 
337                 5.7 
4,750             1.0                 0.9 
2,700                 1.8                 2.0 
3,353                 2.7                 2.5 
2,200                 5.5                 5.6  
2,450                 2.2                 2.8 
2,500                 6.6                 8.8 
2,000                 2.7                 5.3 
1,600               20.3               44.1 
4,300                 8.1               12.0 
                     
3,000                 2.5                 2.8 
 
 
Source: Appendix Table 4. (Board voting shares are perhaps overestimated for railways and 
manufacturing and underestimated for banking and insurance, see nn.59, 104.)   
*includes shipping, wholesalers, retail chains, hotels, theatres, real estate 
†includes plantations, stock-raising and coal, iron ore and chemical mining. Note that data were 
unavailable for most British-owned overseas mining enterprises (see p.6, above) 
‡Most of the breweries by 1911 had more of their assets in distribution than in manufacturing. 
 
 
                                                                           IV 
                       Are these figures high or low? They are certainly lower than some have 
suggested.65 Yet the literature is plagued by vague priors: to some investigators board 
ownership of 5% decisively connotes strong residual personal control, while for 
others (or even for the same investigator with a different axe to grind) it is evidence of 
the contrary.66 Clearly the question can only be answered comparatively: across time 
or space. Though statistics on other markets are sparse, it has been suggested that 
France was nearest to the UK in divorcing ownership from control.67 In Germany 
bearer shares remained ubiquitous, so evidence relates only to shareholders registering 
                                                 
65 In all sectors, except insurance, these figures lie below the levels guesstimated by Hannah 
(“Divorce”); and a fortiori below the levels advocated by his critics.  
66 In 1935 Alfred Sloan’s General Motors - the world’s largest company and Chandler’s classic 
“managerial” firm - had board stockholdings of 6% (or 29% including indirect Du Pont holdings); but 
Chandler classified British  companies with lower board shareholdings and fewer than GM’s seven 
family directors as “personally-owned.”  
67 Hannah, “Divorce.”  
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for AGMs; the 29 meetings so far analysed may not be representative but show levels 
of board control many times higher.68 US corporations maintained full nominative 
registers, but disclosure was not legally required at the federal level until the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act, so comparable research would require labour- intensive 
(and inevitably partial) research in surviving corporate and state archives.  
                  There is scattered evidence that in 1900 US corporate boards had higher 
personal ownership than their UK counterparts, in all three major quoted sectors: 
railroads, financials and industrials.69 The economist Frank W. Taussig, in a 
questionnaire survey of 100 US corporations with between $1.5m and $150m capital 
in 1904-1914, reported that their executives owned 18% of their capital overall (with 
a median of 18.4% and a wide range from less than 1.7% in the lowest one-fifth to 
more than 50% in the highest one-fifth of cases).70 He does not specify how 
representative his sample was of quoted companies or all sectors, but his figures are 
much higher than ours.71 Moreover, a significant number of Americans then had 
family fortunes above $100m and are known to have had larger corporate 
shareholdings than their British counterparts (no Briton even approached such 
extremes of plutocratic wealth).72 
               More comparisons are available for stockholder numbers. Lough’s analysis 
of 327 US corporations of 1913 showed a lower mean number of shareholders (3,828) 
                                                 
68 Franks et al (“Origins,” p. 567) report a median of 26.7% director ownership in 1910 on Frankfurt 
and Munich, without adjustments for shareholders not registering or directors’ Tantiemen; Professor 
Carsten Burhop is currently examining a wider Berlin sample. 
69 Hannah, “Divorce.” 
70 Taussig and Barker, “American Corporations,” pp. 12-13. 
71 FTC, National Wealth, reported a lower mean of 10.7% insider ownership for 1922, and is also 
uncertainly representative. 
72 Rubinstein, Men, pp. 41, 44-6; Rubinstein, ed., Wealth, pp. 18-21, 54. John D Rockefeller’s wealth 
alone has been estimated at $1b (more than the holdings of all directors in all our 337 companies!) and 
he alone held 25% of Standard Oil (worth about $160m in 1911). The largest non-landed estate proved 
in Britain before 1914 - £10.9m ($53m) in 1909, with real estate holdings perhaps adding £1m - was 
that of Charles Morrison, private financier and director of North British & Mercantile Insurance. The 
Duke of Westminster and four other landed aristocrats each had aggregate wealth of similar magnitude. 
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than recorded here (6,177) for 337 UK companies.73 Warshow, the corporate treasurer 
of National Lead, after interrogating his peers in other US companies, provided more 
detail for larger companies.74 If we extract comparably-sized firms from our 
population - the largest 130 firms with an average of £12.4m issued capital - the mean 
UK shareholding (£1,053 or $5,126) is smaller than his averages for the USA ($8,630 
for 78 companies in 1910, $8,700 for 123 companies in 1913). These statistics are too 
uncertainly representative to be conclusive, but leave any proposition that stocks were 
more widely dispersed among small shareholders in the US before 1914 distinctly 
lacking empirical support. 
             Berle and Means later showed that shareholding dispersed very rapidly in the 
USA between 1900 and 1930 (a plausible proposition from which it is hard to detect 
any dissent), and they and other New Deal researchers produced the first comparably 
reliable evidence on officers’ and directors’ holdings for a clearly-defined US 
population in the 1930s, later extended to a fuller range of firms by Holderness et al.75 
If the UK already had a higher level of separation of ownership from control in 1911 
than the US in the 1930s, we can securely confirm that the US was substantially 
“behind” the UK. However, in such comparisons, we need to consider the varying 
propensity of companies to be listed. There were still in 1911 many unquoted firms 
(which, of course, often had levels of board voting control approaching 100%), and if 
a higher proportion of such business assets were in publicly quoted companies in a 
later period and/or different country, comparisons need to take account of this.  
                  Yet the coverage of UK stock exchanges before 1914 was surprisingly 
extensive, even compared to the late twentieth century US or UK. Our 337 companies  
                                                 
73 Lough, Corporation Finance, p. 37. 
74 Warshow, “Distribution,” p. 23. 
75 Means, “Diffusion;” Berle and Means, Modern Corporation; Gordon, “Stockholdings;” Gordon, 
“Ownership;” TNEC, Distribution; Holderness et al, “Were the good old days.” 
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alone probably accounted for a quarter of the UK’s total domestic and overseas capital 
stock of perhaps £13b (which, of course, also includes the housing stock, overseas 
portfolio investments, government assets, unquoted firms and smaller quoted 
companies).76 In view of the non-comparability of capital stock estimates, financial 
economists routinely measure the stock of securities markets relative to (more 
reliably-measured) national income accounting flows. The market capitalisation of 
these 337 companies alone amounted to 167% of UK GNP in 1911 and adding 
smaller UK quoted companies would give an overall ratio higher than recorded for the 
LSE or NYSE at the end of the twentieth century.77  
                 Holderness et al suggest a related method of resolving the problems of 
inter-temporal comparisons for the USA in 1935 and 1995. Because the ratio of the 
market values of their populations to GDP (row 2 in Table 3) is in the same ballpark                       
in 1935 and 1995, they argue that their populations are comparable: the change in 
managerial ownership that they measure over that period was not the result of 
increasing proportions being quoted, masking underlying changes in the separation of 
ownership from control among onetime unquoted firms. In Table 3, we have extended 
their methodology to include a comparison with the UK in 1911. Of course the US  
economy was much larger in 1995 than in 1935, and, a fortiori, than the UK in 1911: 
this is reflected in the increasing numbers of firms (row 2).78 The firms also grew 
larger over time even after correcting for inflation. 79 Since in cross-section larger 
firms exhibit less owner-control, we might expect lower levels of owner-control as the 
                                                 
76 The market value of our companies’ shares was about £2.58b (n. 36, above), and their debentures 
would perhaps add another £0.72b; compare Feinstein, National Income , pp. T104, T110; Stamp, 
British Incomes, p. 404. 
77 Hannah, ?London.? The slightly declining UK ratio in the twentieth century contrasts with an 
initially low but fast-rising US ratio. 
78 In 1935 the USA’s real GDP was 3.75 times the UK’s in 1911 and by 1995 nearly 30 times higher. 
(Maddison, World Economy, pp. 427-9, 466-7). 
79 Holderness et al, “Were the good old days,” p. 440. 
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Table 3. The Separation of Ownership from Control in the World’s Largest 
Securities Market (UK in 1911, then USA).  
          
Date                 1911 (UK)                                   1935 (USA)                      1995 (USA) 
                          
                             
N                                337                                          1,419                                     4,202 
MV of N /GDP %      182*                                         102                                          95 
Share of Board/Officers in votes ( %): 
Mean                         10.1                                            12.9                                      21.1 
Size-weighted Mean   5.5                                              4.2                                        5.9 
Median                        2.8                                              6.5                                      14.4 
 
Sources: cols 1: appendix 4; cols 2 and 3, Holderness et al., “Were the good old days,” pp. 440, 450-1 
(we have added 20% of common stock values to their 1935 figures to allow for their omission of 
preferred stock from their market capitalisation figure; though not in 1995 when the volume of 
preferred stock was negligible). Bonds are included in the market capitalisation figures for both 
countries at par; but similar relationships are found for equity capitalisation alone.  
 
* We standardise on the ratio chosen by Holderness et al, though arguably GNP is a more appropriate 
denominator for cross-country comparisons: there was little difference between GDP and GNP for the 
US, but there was for (more multinationally-invested) Britain. Substituting GNP for GDP, the UK ratio 
in row 3, col 1, falls from 182% to 167%. 
 
 
average quoted firm became bigger. However, as comparison of cols 2 and 3 shows, 
the separation of ownership from control, at some point between 1935 and 1995, 
declined in the USA.  
                   Pursuing further Holderness et al’s logic, we need a UK population with 
a market-value-to-GDP ratio in 1911 comparable to theirs. In order to achieve that 
(see col 1, row 2), we would have to omit many lower-ranked firms from our 
population (which, given that the board’s voting share was inversely related to firm 
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size, would reduce all the UK figures in the lower half of col. 1).80 However, that 
additional step is hardly necessary to make our point, since, even without it, by two 
measures of central tendency in the lower half of Table 3 there was already greater 
divorce of ownership from control in the UK in 1911 than in the USA in either 1935 
or 1995.81 
                  If we restrict the analysis to manufacturing - a sector generally considered 
the most personally-controlled (other than brewing) in both countries - directors’ 
ownership in the UK in 1911 was higher than in equivalent US firms a quarter-
century later.82 But by the mid-1930s, the largest US manufacturing firms about 
equalled the board ownership levels of equivalent UK manufacturers.83Both British 
and American manufacturers rapidly reduced board ownership in the previous quarter 
century.  If, as seems likely, the US was on a faster downward trajectory between 
                                                 
80 Contrary to the implicit assumption, national income accounts show that these economies were less 
capital-intensive at the end of the twentieth century than at the beginning, so a declining market 
capitalisation/GDP ratio is compatible with a higher portion of capital assets being quoted over time. 
Nonetheless, the margins in Table 3 for whatever adjustment is appropriate are rather large. It may 
seem implausible that the UK’s capital stock in 1911 was substantially more securitised, in the 
corporate sense, than the US’s decades later, but note the different nature of their economies. The UK 
in 1911 had much smaller agricultural and government sectors (whose capital stocks were rarely in 
corporate securities) than the US in 1935/1995 and was also a proportionately larger international 
corporate investor. In 1913/4 the UK accounted for 45% of foreign direct investment (FDI) but only 
8% of world real GDP; by 1993 the US share of FDI was still only 26%, much nearer to its ca 21% 
share of world GDP (Maddison, World Economy , p. 641; Jones, Evolution , pp. 30, 53). In 1911, the 
median shareholder numbers (3,000) in our 100 multinationals and free-standing companies mainly 
operating abroad were identical to those for all companies, and their median board voting shares only a 
little lower, so confining the analysis to the 237 largely domestic firms in our population would raise 
the median board ownership only from 2.8 to 3.1.  
81 The third (size -weighted) UK measure (see n. 63, above) is also below the 1995 US level and, if we 
appropriately reduce the number of firms, also falls below the 1935 level.  
82 Compare Gordon (“Stockholdings”) with our figures in Table 2, with or without breweries (an 
extensively personally-owned sector, absent from the US data).  
83 Florence (Ownership, pp. 196-217), examining 58 of the largest domestic British manufacturing 
companies (defined more restrictively than our population, as having £3m+ share capital in 1936 and  
excluding steel and Scottish and Irish companies) found lower levels (mean 8.5%, median 1.9%) of 
board ownership than our figures in Table 3. This is compatible with a decline in UK personal 
ownership in manufacturing, though some of the measured decline could derive from omissions in 
Florence’s study or increasing use of nominee accounts. Taking Gordon’s largest 54 sampled (but 
uncertainly representative) US manufacturers of 1935 (those with assets of $25m+) as roughly 
analogous to Florence’s companies with £3m+ capital, their average directors’ and officers’ stock 
holding had a similar mean of 8.1% (Gordon does not, in his Table IV, report the median). Jeremy (A 
Business History, p. 186) reviews evidence that “family ownership,” variously defined, was not higher 
in Britain than in the USA in the 1930s. 
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1911 and 1935,  British managers  led the USA in separating ownership from control 
before 1914 in manufacturing as well (if not as markedly as in other sectors). 
                   The levels both of stock market development and of the divorce of 
ownership from control shown in Table 3 are higher in the USA than in most other 
economies. Toward the end of the twentieth century, both Japan and the UK (then the 
second and third largest equities markets) registered similarly dispersed ownership 
patterns to the USA’s, but in many other national markets high levels of personal 
ownership were the norm.84 Further detailed comparisons across time are, then, 
superfluous. The UK had, already by 1911, more extensively separated ownership 
from control not only than the US then or later, but than the UK (and, a fortiori, than 
the world as a whole) at the end of the twentieth century.85 There was at least stability 
and more probably an increase in board ownership over the twentieth century in the 
UK and, in some later decades of the century, also in the English-speaking world 
more generally, though whether that was replicated worldwide remains an open 
question.86 
                      The populations and methods of measurement that lead to these 
conclusions have some defects in common. Neither the US nor the UK data, for 
example, capture the influence of all large block-holders who are not directors.87 
Modern disclosure rules require fuller information on nominee, trustee or close 
                                                 
84 La Porta et al., “Corporate Ownership;”, Shleifer and Vishny, “Large Shareholders;” Faccio and 
Lang, “Ultimate Ownership,” Morck, ed., History; Rajan and Zingales, “Great Reversals.” 
85 Faccio and Lang (“Ultimate Ownership”), examining 1,953 publicly-traded UK firms in 1994, find 
37% of companies with a 20+% controlling shareholder, compared with only 16% of whole boards 
with a 20+% share in 1911. With variously limited samples, Franks et al (“Ownership,” pp. 4025-6) 
show little change in median UK holdings by directors and their families in the twentieth century (3.5% 
in 1920, 2.2% in 1950, 2.7% in 1990), all in the same ballpark as our median of 2.8% in 1911.  
86 Hannah, (“Divorce,” pp. 421-22) summarises (not clearly representative) evidence of widespread 
shareholding before 1914 in markets where personal ownership is now more common; see also 
Musacchio, “Laws.” 
87 Compare Shleifer and Vishny (“Large Shareholders,” p. 462) and pp.16-17, above. In their limited 
UK sample, Franks et al (“Ownership,” p. 4024-7) note that the proportion of firms in which no 
shareholder owned 10% or more was 43% in 1920, 49% in 1950 and 40% in 1990, and also that block-
holders changed over the century from insider directors to outsider institutional investors. 
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relatives’ holdings.88 The US figures are also for “directors and officers”, while the 
British figures are for board members alone (some of whom were also officers but 
who collectively numbered one fewer per company).89 On the other hand, Holderness 
et al took no account of preferred stock or differentia l voting, while our method 
registers higher percentages on both counts.90 Such discrepancies could net out either 
way, though probably not sufficiently to subvert our broad conclusions. Certainly, in 
the light of our evidence for the largest stock market of 1911, and the modern 
evidence of the widespread global persistence (and, in some countries, increase) of 
personal ownership, the onus is on anyone claiming that ownership of quoted 
companies became markedly more divorced from control during the twentieth century 
clearly to define and support that view. 
                      Otherwise well- informed commentators, even in Britain, nonetheless for 
many years accepted what became a stylised fact for many social scientists. The later 
twentieth century managerial “revolution” in which ownership was newly “divorced” 
from control was thus widely described as a pervasive and cumulative global 
phenomenon. Such consensus rarely emerges without some corroborating facts and 
unguardedly receptive audiences. For example, Florence reported increasing 
separation of ownership from control among large English industrial and commercial 
companies in 1936-51 (when family firms were heavily taxed),91 while Scott noted 
that the proportion of large UK industrial and financial companies that were family-
controlled declined in 1976-1988 (a period including the “Big Bang” in the finance 
                                                 
88 Per contra , some later incentives to non-disclosure (for example, tax avoidance or takeover 
concealment) were less significant in 1911. 
89 Few of the “officers” in either country with large shareholdings would not also be directors and 
Holderness et al (p. 458, n.20) report “almost identical” results whether officers are included or not. 
90 In the case of the omitted preferences, applying our method to the US data might add 1.2% for the 
average board (Holderness et al, “Were the good old days,” p. 450) 
91 Florence, Ownership. His omission of steel, utilities and railways (which were nationalised in 1945-
51) was necessary, given his objective of measuring change between 1936 and 1951, but excluded 
precisely the firms which already had substantial levels of separation. 
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sector).92 Franks et al found declining board shareholdings over the twent ieth century 
as a whole, though their small sample explicitly excluded sectors where they thought 
ownership was initially widely dispersed.93 The rise of non-owning professional 
managers was a staple of Labour Party modernisers, arguing that capitalism was no 
longer the same as in the “bad old days,” though they were, necessarily, highly 
selective of their exemplars (coal-owners were whipping-boys of choice for historical 
personal ownership, ICI a favourite “modern” corporation).94  
                  None of these partial and biased observations is incompatible with the 
general twentieth century increase in board voting control among UK quoted 
companies, suggested by our data. It was thus not difficult for the myth of constantly 
increasing separation to take centre stage, even in a precociously managerial national 
economy where no less an authority than Keynes had clearly recognised that such 
separation was already firmly established.95 The main intellectual currents arguing 
otherwise appeared prone to tendentious special pleading, which many economists 
instinctively ignored.96 Recently evidence has emerged of increases in personal 
ownership in a wide range of societies, including the USA, Sweden, Italy, France and, 
of course, in ex-communist societies.97 Personal capitalism appears alive and well 
everywhere. 
                       Erroneous generalisations rarely achieve the status of the conventional 
wisdom without some assistance also from false perspectives of hindsight driven by 
the tides of history. One of the reasons why the, precociously advanced, British 
                                                 
92 Scott. “Corporate Control.”  
93 “Ownership,” p. 4020; see also Cheffins (Corporate Ownership, p. 13-17) for many more, partial 
studies. 
94 Crosland, Future of Socialism, pp. 1-42. 
95 Keynes, End. 
96 The theme of much left-leaning sociology was that statistics on increasing divorce, though 
superficially correct, were misleading, because the ruling class still really owned and controlled 
corporate business. This critical tradition experienced surprising difficulty in connecting with the 
reality that the separation was of long-standing and perhaps being reversed. 
97 Aganin and Volpin, “History;” Hogfeldt, “History;” 
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capitalist experience before 1914 entered oblivion was that its manifestations largely 
disappeared in a half century of de-globalisation driven by the compound disasters of 
European wars, tariff escalations and corporate nostrifications and by nationalization 
programmes at home and abroad driven by an exotic mixture of socialism, de-
colonization and technocratic dynamics (the latter promoting a different strain of 
managerialism). The majority of the companies in our 1911 population were, in fact, 
nationalized by British or foreign governments in the following century and were 
conventionally eliminated from later, retrospective studies of trends in the divorce of 
ownership and control in surviving stock market firms.98  
                              
                                                                       V 
 
                      The historical puzzle addressed in much of the existing literature is why 
British businessmen failed to appreciate the advantages of scale and scope, and the 
disadvantages of personal ownership, while the USA pioneered the managerial 
revolution with impressively “modern” dynamism. We have shown that the question 
that requires an answer is closer to the reverse. We will therefore generally seek the 
causes of these changes in vain in the existing business history literature, so it is 
important that the real issues now be addressed. Why have some historians not 
understood that the British had already massively reduced barriers to acceptance of 
stock exchange securitisation, thus promoting the exceptional development of UK 
managerially-controlled enterprises in the half century before 1914? What was it 
about the London capital market that both gave entrepreneurs the confidence to 
                                                 
98 The finance, transport and utilities sectors (accounting for most of market capitalisation on typical 
pre-1914 exchanges) were often omitted from long-run studies of trends in owner control. Most of 
these companies that were not nationalised still survive, if not independently at least as subsidiaries or 
branches of larger companies. 
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reduce personal ownership so early and led investors to believe that directors would 
take reasonable account of outside shareholders’ interests? What did New York 
correspondingly lack in the nineteenth century, but impressive ly develop later? 
                     There is also a range of views about the consequences of the UK’s 
precocious managerial revolution. It is logically possible - though Whigs and 
Weberians alike experience difficulties with the notion - that the British economy was 
disadvantaged by being more “modern” (having less personal ownership) than 
Germany or the USA. Many of our companies in the decades before 1914 were in 
network monopolies or oligopolistic industries in which the pressures of product 
market competition were muted and takeover bids posed little threat to incumbent 
directors. Lacking both the stick of competition and the carrot of personal ownership, 
they have plausibly been suspected of tolerating inefficiency.99  
                    Other scholars have emphasised the positive aspects (social, political and 
economic) of professional management separated from ownership. Yet the later 
increase in UK personal ownership was presumably driven by factors such as the 
growth of new entrepreneurial firms, private equity and executive options, which, 
some might argue, have improved business perfo rmance. Greater personal ownership 
stimulated by Mrs Thatcher’s ill-conceived tax breaks for family firms, on the other 
hand, has recently encouraged nepotistic succession and measurably weakened 
performance.100 So, for those seeking an explanation of Britain’s mild twentieth 
century relative economic decline, our findings might be interpreted as consistent with 
long-run negative agency problems dominating the positive professionalization 
advantages. However, many early generalisations about industrial systems and 
varieties of capitalism have foundered because casually-diagnosed international 
                                                 
99 Dodgson, “British railway;” Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership ; Crafts, 
“British,” p.6; Hannah, “Shareholders’ Dog.”  
100 Bloom & van Reenan, “Inherited family firms.” 
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differences have proved illusory or transitory.101 Alternative micro-economic models 
of governance/performance interactions, acknowledging that there is great variety 
within nations, may offer a better way forward for understanding the chequered 
evolution of managerial capitalism.102 
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Appendix. The Largest Quoted Companies of 1911. 
 
                    Table 4 lists mainly British-owned, entirely or partly British-managed, independent companies in the Investor’s Year Book that had 
£1m or more share capital listed on a UK stock exchange (87% of them on the LSE) at the end of 1911. The companies are ordered 
alphabetically to facilitate consultation, but their rank by nominal value of issued share capital is also shown to the left of the company name.  
 
Table 4. Shareholding and Voting in 337 Independent, UK-owned, Quoted103 Companies with £1m+ Share104 Capital in 
1911. 
 
 
                                                 
103 We estimate that there were around 33 private firms that would have qualified for entry if their capital had been publicly quoted: 9 manufacturers (like Platt Brothers and 
Pilkingtons), 7 financiers (Prudential Insurance and several private bankers), 12 distributors (W H Smith and some international trading companies) and perhaps 5 coal 
mining firms. Probably few of these (e.g. the Rothschild bank) would have been large enough to rank among the largest 100 companies; similarly, from the beginning of the 
FTSE100 index, only three private firms (the latest, Glencore, in 2011) directly entered the index on their IPO. 
104 We excluded companies which had only debentures listed. These were mainly overseas railways and utilities (in which local controlling stockholders often topped up their 
own resources by issuing bond capital in London), but also three large, closely-held, domestic companies: Charrington, London and Burton brewers (with £2.925m privately-
held share capital and £1.053m publicly-quoted debentures), W & A Gilbey, gin distillers and wine and spirit merchants (£1.440m/£0.930m), and S Pearson & Son, public 
works contractors (£1m/£0.378m). The latter was part of a complex, only partly-quoted, giant oil group, a category otherwise excluded by the directory (Bud-Frierman et al., 
“Weetman Pearson”).  See also pp. 5-8, above, for subsidiaries, mainly overseas-owned firms, overseas mines and other quoted omissions. 
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Rank Company Name (and, where not implicit, main 
activity)  
No. of 
Directors 
Issued 
Share 
Capital 
(£million)  
Board’s 
shareholding 
(£) 
No. of 
Share-
Holders 
Board 
Voting, 
Control 
(max%)105 
305 A.J. White (patent medicines) 5 1.000 32,228 2,200 4.3 
92 Alabama, NO, T & Pacific Junction Railway 4 4.000 38,850 1,000 1.0 
130 Alexandra (Newport) Docks & Railway 8 2.620 *26,200 *2,000 2.6 
205 Alliance & Dublin Consumers Gas 6 1.552 *77,600 *2,000 5.0 
66 Alliance Assurance 26 5.450 408,583 9,000 58.4 
267 Alliance Trust 5 1.200 7,770 2,800 2.6 
180 Allsopp (beer) 5 1.870 4,710 8,300 0.3 
305 American Investment Trust 8 1.000 27,200 1,400 2.7 
                                                 
105 Just under a third of the 337 companies issued only one class of share. Within the other 68% issuing more than one class, most (38%) did not differentiate their voting 
power, though 21% deprived some of the vote, while 9% gave only fractional votes. However, even where preference shareholders did not have equal votes, they normally 
retained the right to attend shareholder meetings and vote in exceptional, variously defined, circumstances: when their dividends were in arrear, when it was proposed to issue 
new capital with prior rights, and/or on liquidation. Moreover, many companies limited the votes of large holders: 14% of the 334 companies (mainly in finance) had capped 
voting (limiting the number of shares any individual could hold, or depriving those held above the cap of the vote), while 21% (mainly domestic railways) had tiered voting 
(progressively reduced voting power as the number held increased). Percentages do not sum to 100 because some companies had mixed systems (e.g. non-voting preferences 
and tiered-voting ordinaries). In the case of capped or tiered voting rights, the total number of votes is indeterminate, since it depends not on the (known) amount of voting 
capital but on its (unknown) distribution. Taking our objective of calculating the maximum possible voting power of directors to its logical extreme in such circumstances 
would require the assumption that there was only one non-director shareholder, holding all the remaining shares (since that would minimise the voting power of outsiders). 
Such an assumption is clearly unrealistic (that large a holder would likely have been a director) and demonstrably untrue (non-director shareholders are known to exceed one 
and the average shareholding is well below the cap). In such firms, where directors’ collective holdings exceeded the cap, we have taken the cap times the number of directors 
as the board’s votes and expressed it as a percentage of the total voting capital (less the deducible quantity of directors’ vote-less capital). This will underestimate the board’s 
voting power, if no director held less than the cap and any other holders were capped. In the more common case of tiered voting rules, we have simply ignored the problem: 
that is, we have implicitly assumed that the distribution of shareholdings among the tiers was identical for directors and non-directors. If these companies’ directors owned 
more than the average shareholder (as the data suggest), this simplification will overestimate the board’s votes.  
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252 Anglo South American Bank  10 1.250 66,530 2,250 5.3 
50 Anglo-American Telegraph 3 6.990 24,890 8,000 0.4 
43 Anglo-Argentine Tramways  14 8.200 66,890 6,600 1.3 
62 Antofagasta & Bolivia Railway 6 5.650 11,039 5,500 0.2 
138 Apollinaris & Johannis (spring water) 7 2.380 91,450 4,000 3.8 
85 Argentine Great Western Railway 8 4.250 101,600 5,500 2.4 
185 Argentine Navigation (steamships) 6 1.800 803,585 600 40.2 
123 Argentine North Eastern Railway 7 2.769 113,694 1,000 4.1 
87 Armstrong-Whitworth (ships/arms) 10 4.210 403,516 12,000 12.6 
120 Artizans Labourers & General Dwellings 9 2.939 49,481 5,400 1.7 
209 Assam Bengal Railway 6 1.500 6,230 1,200 0.4 
294 Assam Railways & Trading (coal/timber) 6 1.079 30,690 2,000 5.3 
128 Associated News/Amalgamated Press106 16 2.649 768,678 26,500 61.5 
90 Associated Portland Cement  21 4.082 463,170 7,000 24.1 
146 Atlas Assurance 12 2.200 69,300 3,000 3.2 
305 Bank of Africa 7 1.000 76,600 3,200 7.7 
28 Bank of England 25 14.553 †64,000 †11,000 0.5 
123 Bank of Ireland  15 2.769 †27,690 †3,000 1.0 
225 Bank of Liverpool 18 1.411 594,800 5,440 42.2 
131 Bank of New Zealand  10 2.500 †13,333 †2,000 1.3 
237 Bank of Scotland  26 1.325 †45,050 3,742 3.4 
185 Bankers Investment Trust 6 1.800 33,280 850 1.8 
44 Barclay (banking) 25 8.000 1,797,180 6,570 22.4 
                                                 
106 The Harmsworth newspaper empire was technically two independent companies, but Lord Northcliffe chaired both and he and his brother dominated the shareholdings, so 
we have treated them as a unitary firm. 
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121 Barclay Perkins (beer) 8 2.820 572,900 1,750 48.5 
95 Barry Railway 14 3.884 †38,840 4,600 1.0 
125 Bass Ratcliff & Gretton (beer) 9 2.720 674,900 2,200 49.6 
57 Bengal & North Western Railway 8 6.000 26,793 5,000 0.4 
110 Bengal Nagpur Railway 7 3.000 7,000 2,500 0.2 
79 Bleachers (textile finishing) 37 4.570 †950,000 7,300 41.5 
107 Bolckow Vaughan (steel/coal) 6 3.218 78,129 8,100 2.8 
157 Bombay Baroda & Central India Railway 7 2.000 *20,000 *2,000 1.0 
267 Bombay Electric Supply & Tramways  7 1.200 46,240 5,500 3.8 
157 Bovril (food processing/farming)  6 2.000 36,665 *5,000 3.0 
96 Bradford Dyers (textile finishing) 36 3.856 †300,000 16,000 22.1 
247 Brecon & Merthyr Tydfil Railway 7 1.263 *12,630 *1,500 1.0 
250 Bristol Gas 6 1.258 *37,740 *1,900 3.0 
305 Bristol Tramways & Carriage  10 1.000 68,180 1,800 6.8 
235 Bristol Waterworks 7 1.348 ‡31,150 *2,000 2.8 
185 British Columbia Electric (power, trams) 7 1.800 18,163 4,000 1.5 
245 British Cotton & Wool Dyers 23 1.272 103,030 4,500 8.1 
118 British Electric Traction (tramways) 8 2.947 25,040 6,500 0.8 
196 British India Steam Navigation 6 1.657 175,580 900 10.6 
305 British Insulated & Helsby Cables 6 1.000 76,910 3,000 15.4 
209 British Investment Trust 7 1.500 25,331 2,400 2.8 
252 British Linen Bank 19 1.250 ‡19,000 3,405 1.5 
267 British Oil & Cake Mills (seed-crushing) 11 1.200 67,877 5,000 5.7 
305 British Wagon (hire purchase) 6 1.000 192,860 500 19.3 
122 Brunner Mond (chemicals) 16 2.790 †767,250 9,000 27.5 
31 Buenos Ayres & Pacific Railway 6 12.200 24,717 14,000 0.2 
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13 Buenos Ayres Great Southern Railway 6 34.500 55,900 27,500 0.3 
24 Buenos Ayres Western Railway 5 16.600 83,730 16,000 0.6 
110 Burma Railways  6 3.000 11,970 2,500 0.4 
9 Caledonian Railway 12 45.045 *150,150 35,950 0.5 
70 Calico Printers (textile finishing) 9 5.027 †350,000 16,000 17.4 
103 Cambrian Railways 7 3.341 †33,410 †1,559 1.0 
139 Cammell Laird (ships/steel) 11 2.373 63,480 4,500 5.5 
182 Canadian Car & Foundry (railcars) 8 1.824 †162,569 †1,439 8.4 
5 Canadian Pacific Railway 15 53.168 †975,000 †41,000 1.8 
141 Cannon Brewery 7 2.350 126,492 1,100 72.3 
40 Capital & Counties Bank  11 8.750 214,550 10,000 2.5 
84 Cardiff Railway 6 4.300 †2,200,000 †2,000 51.2 
305 Cargo Fleet Iron 8 1.000 26,730 7,000 2.6 
226 Catalinas Warehouses & Mole 5 1.405 4,500 500 0.3 
15 Central Argentine Railway 7 30.002 166,796 30,000 0.6 
100 Central London Railway 8 3.480 *34,800 *3,000 1.0 
56 Central Uruguay Railway & Extensions  5 6.083 47,580 4,970 0.9 
206 Charing X, West End & City Electricity 5 1.550 141,230 5,700 9.1 
305 Charter Trust & Agency 5 1.000 9,700 10,000 1.0 
267 Chartered Bank 8 1.200 ‡48,000 2,010 4.0 
305 Chinese Engineering & Mining (coal) 12 1.000 9,257 800 0.9 
135 City & South London Railway 5 2.480 *24,800 *3,000 1.0 
252 City of Chicago Brewing & Malting 4 1.250 9,050 1,300 0.7 
208 City of London Brewery 4 1.501 20,361 1,600 1.4 
282 City of London Electric Lighting 5 1.106 18,150 2,700 1.6 
284 City of London Real Property (offices) 7 1.100 32,250 770 4.9 
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305 Clydesdale Bank  9 1.000 95,150 2,914 9.5 
305 Commercial Bank of Scotland  25 1.000 93,500 4,600 9.4 
152 Commercial Gas 7 2.073 *82,920 *3,000 4.0 
117 Commercial Union Assurance 21 2.950 120,900 2,500 4.1 
252 Consett Iron 7 1.250 22,055 3,200 1.8 
157 Consolidated Tea & Lands (plantations) 8 2.000 228,280 3,100 29.3 
305 Continental Union Gas 6 1.000 18,250 1,700 1.8 
276 Cordoba Central Railways  7 1.160 *11,600 1,100 1.0 
209 Courage (beer) 7 1.500 455,500 600 30.4 
252 Crompton & Evans' Union Bank 9 1.250 80,260 1,750 6.4 
143 Cuban Central Railways  4 2.300 5,200 2,000 0.2 
199 Cunard Steamship 8 1.600 85,880 1,500 5.4 
81 Dalgety (merchants/finance) 8 4.500 295,900 1,980 6.6 
305 Debenhams (warehouses, stores) 5 1.000 208,500 1,350 52.9 
157 Debenture Corporation (trustees/insurer) 6 2.000 70,405 3,000 4.5 
263 Direct United States Cable  6 1.214 11,120 1,500 0.9 
202 Distillers (whisky) 12 1.587 136,850 3,400 10.5 
249 Dorman Long (engineering/ships) 14 1.259 302,654 2,700 24.0 
222 Dublin & South Eastern Railway 8 1.460 *14,600 *1,500 1.2 
248 Dublin United Tramways 4 1.260 4,590 5,600 0.7 
157 Dunderland Iron Ore 5 2.000 5,680 3,200 0.3 
149 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre 6 2.119 168,440 14,000 11.3 
194 Eagle Insurance 10 1.679 48,785 850 2.9 
110 Eastern Extension Telegraph 6 3.000 148,840 6,000 5.0 
57 Eastern Telegraph 7 6.000 16,783 10,000 0.4 
280 Eastmans (cold stores, chain butchers) 5 1.126 27,580 2,500 2.4 
 44 
244 Edward Lloyd (paper/pulp) 6 1.275 378,675 2,600 63.1 
278 Egyptian Delta Light Railways 8 1.151 3,060 300 0.3 
227 Ellerman Lines (ships) 3 1.400 659,690 190 70.7 
305 Employers' Liability Insurance 10 1.000 72,860 1,200 7.3 
294 English Scottish & Australian Bank  6 1.079 24,775 1,330 2.3 
157 English Sewing Cotton 7 2.000 †120,000 13,000 12.0 
80 Entre Rios Railways 5 4.517 11,335 3,000 0.3 
305 Equity & Law Life Assurance 22 1.000 150,800 180 15.1 
304 European Gas 6 1.002 34,870 1,600 4.6 
260 Fife Coal 5 1.234 98,117 2,000 8.0 
81 Fine Cotton Spinners & Doublers 22 4.500 421,834 21,000 21.1 
140 Foreign & Colonial Investment Trust 10 2.357 20,067 4,000 0.9 
209 Foreign American & General Investments 11 1.500 43,580 2,200 2.9 
209 Forestal Land Timber & Railways 6 1.500 44,063 1,300 2.9 
63 Furness Railway 7 5.522 *55,220 †5,904 2.1 
99 Furness Withy (shipping/shipbuilding) 12 3.500 817,263 8,250 40.9 
23 Gas Light & Coke 7 18.223 ‡70,000 *15,000 0.4 
281 General Accident Fire & Life Assurance 13 1.107 16,101 3,600 1.6 
305 General Life Assurance 9 1.000 *100,000 *1,000 10.0 
30 Glasgow & South Western Railway 10 13.136 *43,787 11,500 0.6 
264 Glasgow District Subway (cable rail) 5 1.213 *12,130 *1,500 1.0 
98 Globe Telegraph (investment trust) 4 3.622 10,450 9,000 0.3 
178 Gordon Hotels 6 1.930 19,870 6,000 1.0 
262 Grand Junction Canal 9 1.224 ‡9,000 *1,500 0.8 
8 Grand Trunk Railway of Canada 10 47.435 *948,700 †40,000 1.6 
12 Great Central Railway 12 35.433 *118,110 19,800 0.3 
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11 Great Eastern Railway 11 37.689 *126,630 31,950 0.5 
75 Great North of Scotland Railway 12 4.979 *49,790 4,750 3.2 
204 Great Northern & City Railway 5 1.560 *15,600 *1,500 1.0 
10 Great Northern Railway 12 44.375 *147,917 38,500 0.7 
53 Great Northern Railway (Ireland) 13 6.425 *64,250 †8,998 1.6 
37 Great Southern & Western Railway 12 9.646 *94,460 †12,012 1.8 
157 Great Western of Brazil Railway 5 2.000 9,060 2,000 0.5 
3 Great Western Railway 20 73.604 *400,297 55,450 0.5 
157 Guardian Assurance 18 2.000 77,600 2,200 7.8 
127 Guest Keen & Nettlefold (steel/coal) 8 2.685 280,855 5,000 29.1 
49 Guinness (stout) 12 7.000 2,206,410 12,000 44.1 
157 Hibernian Bank  7 2.000 43,920 2,000 2.2 
78 Highland Railway 14 4.653 *46,653 †6,079 1.0 
274 Home & Colonial Stores (grocery chain) 6 1.185 19,320 4,400 12.1 
209 Hongkong & Shanghai Banking 16 1.500 *60,000 4,788 4.0 
305 Howard & Bullough (textile machinery)  6 1.000 278,213 2,300 37.1 
305 Hudson’s Bay (real estate) 9 1.000 *40,000 †7,250 4.0 
77 Hull & Barnsley Railway 10 4.675 *46,750 †6,531 1.0 
76 Imperial Continental Gas 10 4.940 *177,840 *5,500 3.6 
27 Imperial Tobacco 28 15.500 5,247,256 16,000 100.0 
223 Ind Coope (beer) 8 1.448 *57,920 1,600 4.0 
209 Industrial & General Trust 8 1.500 18,362 3,000 1.2 
305 International Investment Trust 5 1.000 40,322 1,300 4.0 
284 International Tea (chain grocery)  9 1.100 304,430 1,800 27.7 
89 Interoceanic Railway of Mexico 7 4.100 23,768 1,300 0.8 
157 Investment Trust Corporation 4 2.000 30,845 1,900 1.5 
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34 J & P Coats (sewing thread) 16 10.000 †2,250,000 23,700 50.0 
251 J. Lyons (restaurants, bakery) 10 1.256 11,500 9,000 3.2 
101 John Brown (ships/arms/steel) 8 3.423 116,453 6,789 6.4 
265 Kellner-Partington Paper Pulp 6 1.210 279,208 1,600 28.8 
284 Lagunas Syndicate (nitrate) 7 1.100 71,740 1,164 6.5 
193 Lancashire & Yorkshire Bank  10 1.725 73,980 4,087 4.3 
6 Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway 14 50.091 *166,970 24,600 0.3 
203 Law Union and Rock Insurance 28 1.575 108,153 1,900 34.8 
236 Leeds & Liverpool Canal 9 1.338 *53,520 *2,000 4.0 
305 Leeds Fireclay 5 1.000 36,250 2,200 3.6 
305 Legal & General Life Assurance 18 1.000 †68,000 †900 6.8 
41 Leopoldina Railway 4 8.536 19,000 9,500 0.2 
67 Lever Bros (soap/chemical) 10 5.370 2,115,180 8,000 39.4 
284 Liebigs Extract of Meat 5 1.100 18,745 1,000 3.1 
146 Linen Thread 18 2.200 639,210 1,700 58.1 
144 Lipton (grocery chain/tea plantations) 5 2.250 †400,000 33,000 17.8 
297 Lisbon Electric Tramways  9 1.060 166,383 500 15.7 
206 Lister (silk) 6 1.550 512,820 2,200 54.0 
136 Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance 13 2.456 16,354 2,700 0.7 
241 Liverpool United Gas Light 12 1.279 ‡18,000 †1,500 1.4 
16 Lloyd’s Bank  18 26.201 758,100 22,500 1.7 
157 London & Brazilian Bank  8 2.000 37,360 2,300 1.9 
129 London & Lancashire Fire Insurance 22 2.641 13,000 2,000 0.5 
2 London & North Western Railway 20 85.863 †205,310 70,600 0.5 
199 London & Provincial Bank  8 1.600 30,630 6,000 1.9 
305 London & Provincial Marine & General 8 1.000 129,500 450 13.0 
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Insurance 
157 London & River Plate Bank  8 2.000 47,125 2,700 2.4 
131 London & South Western Bank  7 2.500 45,150 5,000 1.8 
14 London & South Western Railway 12 33.238 *110,793 32,700 0.4 
242 London Bank of Australia 7 1.277 16,672 2,000 1.3 
19 London Brighton & South Coast Railway 10 21.726 *112,979 11,000 0.7 
21 London Chatham & Dover Railway 6 19.260 *64,200 16,850 0.2 
22 London City and Midland Bank  17 19.148 208,500 19,500 0.2 
29 London County & Westminster Bank  27 14.000 85,600 27,000 0.6 
221 London General Omnibus  10 1.488 10,470 3,000 1.0 
20 London Joint Stock Bank 19 19.800 519,400 11,000 2.6 
94 London Tilbury & Southend Railway 7 3.916 *39,160 3,970 1.9 
131 London United Tramways  4 2.500 21,890 2,000 1.0 
71 Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway 10 5.000 9,070 6,000 0.2 
238 Magadi Soda (natural chemicals) 9 1.313 17,028 1,400 1.3 
38 Manchester & Liverpool District Banking 14 9.480 403,020 6,300 21.3 
65 Manchester and County Bank  9 5.460 339,600 2,000 6.2 
39 Manchester Ship Canal 21 9.058 *181,160 34,000 2.0 
137 Manila Railway 5 2.399 11,070 950 0.5 
157 Mann Crossman & Paulin (beer) 8 2.000 968,060 1,000 100.0 
179 Maple (furniture) 15 1.875 57,660 10,000 40.5 
305 Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph (radio) 9 1.000 26,121 3,500 2.6 
305 Martin's Bank  6 1.000 321,740 170 32.2 
305 Mather & Platt (engineering) 8 1.000 327,365 1,000 48.1 
144 Mercantile Investment & General Trust 5 2.250 39,130 2,800 1.7 
252 Merchants Trust 6 1.250 30,770 1,600 2.5 
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153 Mersey Railway 6 2.061 *20,610 *2,000 1.0 
224 Metropolitan Amalgamated (railcars) 12 1.433 68,345 4,500 7.2 
64 Metropolitan Bank  11 5.500 137,250 3,000 2.3 
36 Metropolitan District Railway 8 9.757 *95,570 1,600 1.6 
230 Metropolitan Electric Supply 6 1.381 83,770 3,500 7.8 
32 Metropolitan Railway 8 11.749 *117,490 8,950 0.8 
305 Meux’s  Brewery 3 1.000 1,600 400 0.2 
60 Mexican Railway 11 5.821 14,000 5,000 0.2 
88 Midland Great Western Railway (Ireland) 6 4.197 *41,970 *5,766 1.8 
1 Midland Railway 15 152.094 *506,980 79,400 0.7 
229 Millar’s Karri & Jarrah (timber) 8 1.390 24,819 4,500 1.7 
252 Mortgage Company of Egypt 11 1.250 57,500 900 4.6 
299 Moss Empires (variety theatres) 4 1.039 22,100 3,600 2.1 
192 Natal Bank 3 1.741 86,900 1,400 5.0 
47 National Bank (Ireland) 13 7.500 80,400 7,880 1.1 
110 National Bank of Egypt 16 3.000 †400,000 †3,000 13.3 
199 National Bank of India  8 1.600 90,560 933 5.7 
209 National Bank of New Zealand  6 1.500 26,812 1,320 1.8 
71 National Bank of Scotland  14 5.000 15,150 3,200 0.3 
284 National Bank of South Africa 11 1.100 *44,000 *1,000 4.0 
86 National Discount  9 4.233 93,800 3,394 2.2 
26 National Provincial Bank of England  12 15.900 ‡360,000 17,545 2.3 
47 National Telephone  9 7.500 90,550 13,500 1.3 
157 New Zealand & Australian Land (sheep) 8 2.000 51,819 1,800 5.2 
148 Newcastle & Gateshead Water 7 2.147 *21,470 *2,000 10.0 
154 Newcastle-upon-Tyne & G Gas 9 2.026 ‡54,000 *2,000 2.7 
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231 Newcastle-upon-Tyne Electric Supply 9 1.376 51,130 3,500 3.7 
181 Nitrate Railways  9 1.856 22,700 1,500 1.2 
157 Nizam’s Railways  5 2.000 5,950 *2,000 0.3 
105 Nobel Dynamite 14 3.285 41,410 4,500 1.8 
81 North British & Mercantile Insurance 25 4.500 *450,000 *5,000 16.4 
190 North British Locomotive  9 1.750 495,770 1,600 49.6 
7 North British Railway 15 49.155 *163,850 34,550 0.5 
240 North Eastern Banking 9 1.286 148,720 1,560 11.6 
4 North Eastern Railway 19 56.497 *188,323 43,450 0.3 
116 North London Railway 10 2.984 *29,840 2,650 1.5 
106 North of Scotland & Town & Country Bank  12 3.260 71,620 5,250 2.2 
45 North Staffordshire Railway 9 7.847 *78,470 †7,400 1.7 
110 Northern Assurance 12 3.000 95,000 3,300 3.2 
131 Northern Banking 4 2.500 25,500 4,500 1.2 
284 Norwich Union Fire Insurance 22 1.100 61,726 1,100 5.6 
239 Ottoman Imperial Railway 6 1.294 *12,940 *1,500 1.0 
33 Parr’s Bank 18 11.024 347,250 10,300 3.1 
305 Pearson & Knowles Coal & Iron 6 1.000 88,420 1,161 8.8 
265 Pease & Partners (coal mines) 7 1.210 143,140 3,000 15.2 
259 Pekin Syndicate (coal mines, railway)  7 1.243 7,012 3,000 20.4 
142 Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation 10 2.320 ‡20,000 4,500 0.9 
25 Peruvian Corporation (natural chemicals) 8 16.500 6,550 4,000 0.0 
157 Peter Walker & Son (beer) 5 2.000 1,258,610 1,200 100.0 
108 Phoenix Assurance 10 3.211 143,560 3,889 4.5 
305 Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills 3 1.000 30,920 500 4.1 
261 Port Talbot Railway & Docks 8 1.230 *12,300 *1,500 1.0 
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300 Powell Duffryn Steam Coal 8 1.033 177,092 1,100 20.2 
97 Primitiva Gas of Buenos Aires 9 3.700 *25,000 1,400 1.0 
91 Provincial Bank of Ireland  10 4.080 54,660 3,300 0.4 
305 Railway Debenture & General Trust 5 1.000 39,760 1,500 4.0 
102 Railway Investment (investment trust) 3 3.400 3,000 2,500 0.1 
233 Regent’s Canal & Dock 9 1.358 *40,740 *1,500 3.0 
156 Rhodesia Railways Trust 4 2.006 2,480 900 0.1 
305 Rhymney Iron 5 1.000 34,160 1,160 3.4 
176 Rhymney Railway 7 1.981 *19,810 *1,800 1.0 
272 Rio de Janeiro City Improvements 5 1.193 17,725 1,500 1.5 
209 Royal Bank of Ireland  6 1.500 19,350 2,180 1.3 
157 Royal Bank of Scotland  11 2.000 †80,000 †3,519 4.0 
119 Royal Insurance 17 2.945 69,760 4,000 2.4 
209 Royal Mail Steam Packet 9 1.500 †500,000 †3,000 33.3 
209 Rylands & Sons (cotton warehouses) 9 1.500 150,620 2,500 10.0 
227 Salt Union 6 1.400 13,160 4,300 1.1 
92 San Paulo Railway 6 4.000 14,300 6,500 0.5 
185 Scottish American Investment 6 1.800 28,439 3,550 3.9 
245 Scottish American Mortgage  5 1.272 28,439 2,400 3.6 
284 Scottish Australian Investment  6 1.100 *150,000 *1,000 30.0 
69 Scottish Union and National Insurance 12 5.087 *508,700 *5,000 10.0 
267 Sheffield & Hallamshire Bank  5 1.200 34,360 700 2.9 
273 Sheffield & South Yorkshire Navigation 10 1.190 *47,600 600 4.0 
277 Sheffield Banking 5 1.154 72,850 1,000 2.5 
177 South African Breweries 7 1.965 128,095 4,000 6.5 
17 South Eastern Railway 12 23.821 *79,403 15,350 0.5 
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305 South Indian Railway 6 1.000 12,400 1,000 1.2 
52 South Metropolitan Gas 10 6.430 *128,600 †9,000 2.0 
301 South Staffordshire Waterworks 7 1.030 *41,200 *1,200 4.0 
104 Southern Punjab Railway 4 3.300 7,000 2,500 0.2 
305 Spillers & Bakers (flour mills) 8 1.000 137,560 1,850 13.8 
185 St Louis Breweries 6 1.800 24,760 2,200 1.4 
55 Standard Bank of South Africa 8 6.194 31,683 6,000 0.5 
284 Staveley Coal & Iron 5 1.100 76,619 1,750 7.1 
283 Steel Bros (India merchants) 4 1.101 406,600 500 100.0 
198 Stewarts & Lloyds (steel) 11 1.612 200,019 3,350 12.4 
34 Suez Canal 32 10.000 ‡160,000 †40,000 2.0 
275 Swan Hunter & WR (engineering/ships) 12 1.174 341,209 1,400 37.7 
42 Taff Vale Railway 11 8.296 *82,960 8,050 1.0 
155 Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance 16 2.010 110,880 1,720 5.5 
293 Tredegar Iron & Coal 9 1.088 89,996 1,800 8.3 
190 Trust & Agency of Australasia  6 1.750 79,890 2,500 9.1 
298 Trustees Executors & Securities Insurance 5 1.050 29,193 2,200 2.8 
110 Ulster Bank 4 3.000 46,500 7,139 1.6 
71 Underground Electric Railway 14 5.000 88,000 400 1.8 
209 Union Bank of Australia 12 1.500 107,700 3,500 1.6 
71 Union Bank of Scotland  14 5.000 98,000 3,118 2.0 
195 Union Castle Mail Steamship  9 1.658 32,590 2,500 2.3 
18 Union of London & Smith’s Bank  30 22.934 2,087,200 9,500 2.9 
61 United Alkali 12 5.818 431,860 8,000 7.4 
184 United Collieries 4 1.801 10,039 2,185 0.6 
59 United Counties Bank  11 5.967 155,780 6,380 2.6 
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51 United Railways of the Havana & R W 6 6.470 4,700 2,700 0.0 
279 United River Plate Telephone  5 1.150 7,275 1,600 0.6 
197 Van den Bergh (margarine) 6 1.655 201,859 8,000 32.3 
68 Vickers (ships/arms/steel/engineering) 15 5.200 †555,000 22,000 13.9 
126 Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power 13 2.702 *108,080 *2,000 7.6 
109 Wall Paper Manufacturers 16 3.189 875,513 5,000 39.9 
303 Waring & Gillow (furniture) 7 1.005 67,947 2,500 10.8 
234 Waterlow & Sons (stationers/printers) 9 1.350 *50,000 1,500 3.7 
54 Watney Combe Reid (beer) 8 6.322 877,232 5,000 51.3 
243 West India & Panama Telegraph 5 1.276 6,320 1,800 0.5 
284 Western Railway of Havana  6 1.100 25,180 1,100 2.3 
151 Western Telegraph 8 2.079 13,500 4,500 0.6 
296 Westminster Electric Supply 7 1.068 15,800 2,700 1.5 
175 Whitbread (beer) 10 1.989 1,006,300 900 100.0 
232 White Pass & Yukon Railway 5 1.375 74,470 700 5.4 
183 Wigan Coal & Iron (+steel) 5 1.810 640,450 800 35.4 
157 William Cory & Son (coal factors) 8 2.000 175,695 6,000 8.8 
305 William McEwan (beer) 4 1.000 500,000 1,450 50.0 
46 Williams Deacon's Bank  13 7.813 402,860 3,000 5.2 
150 Workington Iron & Steel 14 2.097 125,713 *2,500 11.5 
302 Worthington (beer) 7 1.028 231,650 1,500 86.4 
 
 
Sources: authors’ calculations from data in Investor’s Year Book 1912; Stock Exchange Official Intelligence 1912 and other sources as detailed in the text. Note that column 3 
x 100 divided by column 2 x 1m defines the percentage of shares owned by each board: column 5 sometimes differs from this because of differential voting rules. 
 
* Estimated (see n. 23, above). Data for individual companies should thus not be considered definitive, though the aggregates are unlikely to be misleading. 
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† data estimated from other sources than the Investor’s Year Book (see n.22, above).  
 
‡ The voting power is calculated from voting caps (see n.106, above) and accurately represents the likely voting maximum, but directors’ ownership (similarly derived in 
column 3) is likely to be mis -estimated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
